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NOTE FOR: SA/DDO

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Attached is an unclassified article from Signal Magazine about the intelligence process and the state of U.S. intelligence today. I think you may find the article interesting and I offer it to you for such use as you may see fit. If you have any questions or comments, please let me know.

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Attachment





FOREWORD



Adm. B. R. Inman, USN **Deputy Director** Central Intelligence Agency

THROUGHOUT THIS NATION'S history, we have understood the need for first class intelligence in periods of tension or danger. Now is such a time. In the 1980s, U.S. intelligence will be needed more than ever to provide vital support to our national security processes. The challenges to this nation and to U.S.

intelligence will be large ones.

Intelligence is important because, in a very real sense, it acts as the senses of our nation's government—our eyes, ears, etc. Intelligence can sharpen our vision, increase our understanding and aid in making wise decisions. To allow this, however, intelligence must be timely and accurate. There are few jobs more important to our country than to recognize the earliest indications of future international problems and to alert our national leaders quickly. And there are few tasks more important than to find and explain the details of potential foreign conflict, challenges to our economy, or, thankfully, the fact of continued peace. The importance of this work transcends politics, and professional intelligence officers are non-partisan servants of our society. Their calling is as noble as that of the professor, businessman or diplomat.

The major challenges to U.S. intelligence in the 1980s will continue to be those that developed since the catastrophic start of World War II:

• The increasing diversity of the world, including the steady emergence of the USSR as a powerful and hostile force;

• The technological revolution in Western society

and in the intelligence profession as well;

• The recognition that intelligence can help more areas of government than just diplomatic and military

• The realization, as a result of the above points, that there are more subjects about which we need intelligence;

• The glut in data, with the result that important information is not only harder to find but also harder to

 The need for support structures, including communications, that span the earth when and where we need them.

In addition to these challenges, U.S. intelligence has had to cope with increasingly persistent attention by the news media and has had to learn how to interact with Congress, both as a user of finished intelligence and as an overseer of its performance.

At the same time we deal with these on-going challenges, we have lesser ones to face as well. Although less critical, they are vexing nonetheless because many of them are the historic foundations of intelligence as a profession. One example is finding and retaining the highest caliber people, while at the same time developing and maintaining our professional skills, such as foreign languages. Another example is the protection of our intelligence sources and methods against penetration by the intelligence services of foreign governments. And a third is the judicious maintenance and protection of the great trust that this nation places in our use of secrecy within a democracy

of laws and personal freedom.

After a decade of directed searching, and finding, intelligence capabilities which we ostensibly could do without, we now have an Intelligence Community too lean in many ways. We face pacing questions-what do we need today, and what will we need in the latter half of the decade? These are not easy questions. As we struggle with them, we will have to recognize that all of the basic arenas of U.S. intelligence need attention and strengthening—collection, production, counterintelligence, covert action and support. Strengthening U.S. intelligence, or rebuilding where necessary, will not occur in just a few weeks; but if we hope to be better in the 1980s, then we must start today. As we address these questions, knowing that we will be competing for resources against other important programs in the government, we need to plan wisely and to articulate our programs well. As we do so, we will create and maintain the non-partisan support for high quality intelligence that the Executive Branch, the Congress, and the American people need and deserve.